In 2013, the global mobile app market was estimated at over US $50 billion and is expected to grow to $150 billion in the next 2 years. In this paper, we build a structural econometric model to quantify the vibrant platform competition between mobile (smartphone and tablet) apps on the Apple iOS and Google Android platforms and estimate consumer preferences towards different mobile app characteristics. We find that app demand increases with the in-app purchase option wherein a user can complete transactions within the app. On the contrary, app demand decreases with the in-app advertisement option where consumers are shown ads while they are engaging with the app. The direct effect on app revenue from the inclusion of an in-app purchase and in-app advertisement option is equivalent to offering a 28 percent price discount and increasing price by 8 percent, respectively. We also find that a price discount strategy results in a greater increase of app demand in Google Play compared to Apple App Store, and app developers can maximize their revenue by providing 50% discount on their paid apps. Using the estimated demand function, we find that mobile apps have enhanced consumer surplus by approximately $33.6 billion annually in the US, and discuss various implications for mobile marketing analytics, app pricing and app design strategies.
Introduction " The global market for mobile applications will soon be worth more than the market for traditional music. That's pretty significant when you think the market barely existed a couple of years ago, and now it's expected to grow to more than $17 billion by 2012." CNET March 2010
Mobile devices are changing the way that people communicate, work, and socialize. Much of the growing adoption and innovation in the industry is driven by mobile apps. Mobile apps are now being used worldwide to perform a variety of tasks -access social networks, read ebooks, play games, listen to music, watch videos and many other meaningful aspects of our lives. According to the IDC (2013) annual mobile application downloads on smartphones, tablets, and similarly specified mobile computing devices will increase from $87.8 billion in 2013 to $187 billion in 2017. Revenue from end users is forecast to increase from $10.3 billion in 2013 to $25.2 billion in 2017. The increasing availability of app-level data presents exciting opportunities for business analytics, especially mobile analytics.
Apps can be offered either for free or for a price. Some consumers are willing to pay more for additional features in higher quality apps while some consumers only download free versions of apps with limited features. In a world where freemium is becoming common, some consumers purchase a paid version after trying the free version. This feature also lends itself to some interesting business analytics.
App developers can use information on the price elasticity of different app categories to determine whether to offer an app for free, and if not for free, how much to charge it. Moreover, given that app stores often collect one-off or subscription fees for paid-apps, it can be useful for them to obtain precise estimates of user demand. Knowledge of heterogeneous consumer intrinsic preferences towards mobile app characteristics can help app developers design and improve their app features, determine pricing strategies in order to better monetize their apps, and optimize their content and navigation. It can help advertisers understand what kinds of apps and app features consumers like to purchase and use.
There can be several other practical benefits from research on mobile-related business analytics. For app developers, revenues can be generated not just from the purchase of applications, but also from micro-transactions within an app. In-app advertisement is increasingly becoming the predominant way for app developers to monetize their apps. An in-app purchase option provides a middle ground between offering an app at a premium price without any ads versus offering it for free but including ads. Mobilerelated business analytics such as estimating demand for apps with the above features can help developers design apps that are more likely to engage users. Further, leveraging mobile app analytics can help advertisers predict the most popular apps before they become popular and optimize merchandizing such as placement of product links and ads within the app accordingly. In addition, understanding mobile app audience demographics can help advertisers target ads based on the interests and composition of mobile app users.
advertisement, app age, and age restrictions. Compared to lifestyle apps, games, social, and utility apps have higher marginal costs while media apps have lower marginal costs. These results are robust to a variety of alternate modeling specifications.
Interestingly, app developers tend to lower their upfront app prices when they provide an in-app purchase option within their apps. With regard to in-app advertisement, it adversely affects app demand.
Our counterfactual experiments also show that the in-app purchases and in-app advertisement bring the same level of changes in revenues as one would get from offering a 28% price discount and increasing price by 8%, respectively. A price discount strategy results in a greater increase of app demand in
Google Play compared to Apple App Store. Our findings also suggest that app developers can maximize revenue from paid app sales by lowering the price by 50% in our context. Using the estimated demand function, we measure changes in consumer surplus from the availability of mobile apps. We find that availability of the top ranked apps in both Apple and Android platforms enhanced consumer surplus in the US by approximately $33.6 billion on an annual basis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the related literature in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe the data. Section 4 describes the econometric models and Section 5 provides the results. Section 6 discusses the managerial implications of the results.
Prior Literature
In this section, we discuss multiple streams of relevant literatures such as user behavior in mobile media and demand and welfare estimation from the introduction of new goods.
Audience behavior in mobile media
Our paper builds on and relates to the literatures on user behavior in mobile media. A stream of relevant literature has discussed users' usage patterns of voice calls and short message service in the mobile phone setting. For example, Danaher (2002) and Iyengar et al. (2008) study how many phone call minutes are consumed under different pricing packages. Kim et al. (2010) examine to what extent the usage of mobile phone voice service can substitute short message service.
Further, our study builds on an emerging stream of literature on mobile marketing. Shankar and Balasubramanian (2008) provide an extensive review of mobile marketing. Shankar et al. (2010) develop a conceptual framework for mobile marketing in the retailing environment and discuss retailers' mobile marketing practices. Sinisalo (2011) examines the role of the mobile medium among other channels within multichannel CRM communication. Spann et al. (2012) discuss impact of weather and distance on coupon redemption. Danaher et al. (2012) evaluate the effectiveness of mobile phone promotions. Bart et al. (2013) study mobile advertising campaigns and find that they are effective at increasing favorable attitudes for higher (versus lower) involvement products. Hui et al. (2013) examine how mobile phone based in-store coupons can affect unplanned spending. A recent stream of work has investigated user behavior on the mobile internet by mapping the interdependence between mobile content generation and usage (Ghose and Han 2011), documenting differences in search costs and location activities on mobile phones vs. PCs (Ghose et al. 2013a) and quantifying the economic impact of tablets in the digital commerce market and examining its synergies with other channels -PCs and smartphones (Ghose et al. 2014 ).
Another emerging stream of work has started using randomized field experiments to causally measure cross-platform synergies between web and mobile advertising (Ghose et al. 2013b) , quantify how geographic distance between the user and a store, and the rank of the offer on the mobile screen influences mobile coupon engagement rates (Molitor et al. 2013) , investigate how ad creative characteristics such as format, USP and message appeal account for differences in advertising effectiveness across smartphones, tablets, and PCs (Kleine et al. 2014) , examine how user responses to targeted mobile offers varies based on location and time (Luo et al. 2014 ) and quantify how crowds influence users' propensity to respond to targeted mobile offers (Andrews et al. 2014 ).
To our knowledge, there are only a few papers that focus on economic and social aspects of mobile apps. Carare (2012) builds a reduced-form model and shows the impact of today's bestseller rank information on tomorrow's demand using Apple App Store data. Garg and Telang (2012) provide a methodology to calibrate sales ranking and sales quantity relationship for apps using publicly available data from Apple App Store. Kim et al. (2013) demonstrate that the usage of an app is influenced by its structural positioning in the app network (or App-Net). Han et al. (2014a) quantify the intrinsic preference and satiation levels of different app categories using individual-level mobile app time-use data. Han et al. (2014b) examine whether addiction to mobile platform apps is socially rational. Bresnahan et al. (2014) examine the platform choice by mobile app developers, including the decision to multi-home. Liu et al. (2014) illustrate how the threat of competitors' entry influences the timing and quality of app entry. To our knowledge, no previous study has estimated a structural model of consumer demand in a mobile app setting using data on various app characteristics from the two major app stores -Apple App Store and Google Play. Thus, this paper thus makes a number of important contributions.
Demand and welfare estimation of new products
A long literature documents the models of demand estimation. One model that has made a significant contribution to the field is the random-coefficients discrete-choice model of demand (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995, henceforth BLP) . The BLP method is superior to the logit model because it can be estimated using only market-level price and quantity data and it deals with the endogeneity of prices (Nevo 2000) . The wider literature on demand estimation using the BLP method also estimated the welfare consequences of the introduction of new products. Such welfare gains have been documented in a variety of industries such as automobiles (Berry et al. 1993 , Petrin 2002 ), computers (Greenstein 1994 , cellular phones (Hausman 1999), books (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003) , direct broadcast satellites and cable TV (Goolsbee and Petrin 2004) , and elsewhere. We add to this literature by estimating consumer demand for mobile apps and by linking it to the literature on the economics of the internet.
Empirical Background and Data Description
We provide an overview of the empirical background for our data, describe variables in the data, and provide brief theoretical explanation on why the various app characteristics should influence the demand for an app. In March 2012, of the 3.1 billion apps that were downloaded worldwide from two leading app stores -Apple App Store and Google Play (Xyologic 2012) . We gathered mobile app profile and demand panel data from Apple App Store and Google Play from the US market. We collected the data between September 5, 2012 and January 10, 2013 (4 months). The data includes 4,706 distinct apps in App Store and 2,624 apps in Google Play. The total number of apps from two app stores in the data may not be the same because some apps appear more (or less) often in each app store.
Our dataset includes daily panel data on smartphone app sales rank, app prices, app characteristics, and user review data from Apple App Store and Google Play. The apps in the daily app data consist of both top-400 free apps and top-400 paid apps from each app store. The app ranking information is based on a download data from sales charts in each app store. We capture an exhaustive list of app-related information provided to consumers when they browse in these app stores. The observed app characteristics in our sample include: We use app developers' textual and visual description of an app to measure the number of characters in app description text and to measure the number of screenshots, respectively. Prior work has
shown that textual information embedded in ecommerce websites affect consumer purchase decisions.
For example, Decker and Trusov (2010) use text mining to estimate the relative effect of product attributes and brand names on the overall evaluation of the products. Hence we posit that there is a relationship between app description length and app demand. find that the information extracted from visual images of hotels (for example, whether the hotel is near the beach)
influences consumer decisions on hotel reservation. Hence, we posit that there is a relationship between the number of screenshots about an app and the app demand.
We use app developers' self-rating with regard to age-restriction. In both app stores, there are consistently 4 classification levels -"4+", "9+", "12+", and "17+" in App Store and "everyone", "low maturity", "medium maturity", and "high maturity" in Google Play. For example, according to Google
Play's (2012) rating guideline, apps that include suggestive or sexual references must be rated "medium maturity" or "high maturity." Apps that focus on suggestive or sexual references must be rated "high maturity." We treat "4+" in App Store and "everyone" in Google Play as the corresponding level, "+9"
in App Store and "low maturity" in Google Play as the corresponding level, and so on. Since apps in different levels of age-restriction mainly appeal to different segments of consumers, they can have different impact on app demand. In accordance with Distimo's (2011) We also collected user reviews from each app store because it is well known from the literature that user generated product reviews affect sales. 
Econometric Model
In this section, we present a random coefficients nested logit model to estimate the distribution of consumer preferences towards different mobile app characteristics especially when the apps are categorized as free apps and paid apps and grouped into predetermined categories. We then combine the demand model with a cost function to incorporate the pricing behavior in a differentiated product market. The estimates from this analysis are then used towards conducting counterfactual experiments and calculating consumer welfare gains in the next section.
Demand Side: Random Coefficient Nested Logit Model
In our model, the utility for consumer i from choosing app j in market t can be represented as:
where X jt is a vector of observable characteristics of app j in market t and β i is a vector of the random coefficients (i.e., taste parameters) associated with those app characteristics. 2 P jt is the price of app j in market t and α i is a scalar for a random coefficient that captures consumers' heterogeneous tastes towards app price. ξ jt represents the unobserved (by researchers) characteristics of app j. The price parameter allows us to examine the impact of different pricing strategies. For example, we evaluate the impact on demand as an app developer changes its pricing scheme. Moreover, we can assess the impact on demand when the developer provides various levels of price discount. In addition, we control for app versions, app developers, app platform, cross-chart correlation, cross-platform correlation, time trends, and the volume and valence of user reviews.
We use a three-level nested logit model to place the alternatives in nests. At the top level there are two nests: one for the free apps and one for the paid apps. This is because apps are usually grouped into two predetermined groups -free and paid -in major app stores including Apple App Store and Google Play. At the middle level there is one nest for each app category. This is also because apps are grouped into seven predetermined categories -games, entertainment, social, multimedia, utilities, education, and lifestyle. Lastly, at the bottom level there are apps of the same category from a given list (free or paid).
The tree graph of the structure of apps is shown in Figure 1 .
We assume that a mean-zero stochastic term represents an app-level taste shock. ̅ is distributed extreme value or follows a more general "nested logit" distribution, which allows preferences to be correlated across apps in the same nest. Suppose we assign app j to a top-level nest g where the groups g = 0 (outside goods), 1 (free apps), and 2 (paid apps) and a middle-level nest h where the groups h = 1 2 We define a "market" as the combination of an "app store" and a "day" (see Section 4.5 for details on market definition and market share computation).
(games), 2 (entertainment), 3 (social), 4 (multimedia), 5 (utilities), 6 (education), and 7 (lifestyle). More specifically, following Cardell (1997) , we decompose ̅ as follows:
where ( ) and ℎ( ) are nesting parameters ranged between 0 and 1, ( ) and ℎ( ) are random variables with the unique distribution with the property that if is distributed extreme value, then ̅ is also distributed extreme value. The nesting parameters can be interpreted as the degree of preference correlation between apps of the same nest. So consumer preference towards apps in the same nest may be correlated. As λ goes zero, consumers perceive apps of the same nest as perfect substitutes relative to apps in the other nest. As λ goes one, the within-group correlation goes to zero, thus the model reduces to the standard logit. 3 It should be also noted that because of consumer-specific random taste coefficients -and β i -, two apps in different nests could still have utilities which are more highly correlated than apps in the same nest.
We follow the BLP (1995) method and model the distribution of consumers' taste parameters. Specifically, our model captures taste heterogeneity of users by incorporating observed and unobserved individual characteristics. Formally, this is modeled as:
The vector ( ̅, ̅ ), which is referred to as the mean utility of price and app characteristics, is common to all consumers. It measures the average weight placed by the consumers. In addition, D i is a vector of demographic variables that include user age and gender. * ( ) is a nonparametric empirical distribution observed at the app store level using other data sources (AdMob 2010). Π is a matrix of coefficients that measure how the taste characteristics vary with observed demographics. Further, v i is a vector capturing the additional unobserved consumer-specific preference towards app price and app characteristics. It follows a multivariate normal distribution. is a scaling matrix. Following the demand estimation literature (BLP 1995 , Nevo 2001 ), we assume that v i has a standard normal distribution, and the vector Σ allows for each element of v i to have a different standard deviation (Nevo 2000) . 4 This specification allows the observed demographics and the unobserved factor to determine the consumer-specific taste.
Combining equations (1) - (3) and defining the mean utility for app j, = ̅ + ̅ + , we rewrite our model for u ijt as follows:
Our goal is then to estimate the mean utilities vector ( ̅, ̅ ), Π matrix of coefficients, the standard deviations in vector Σ, and the nesting coefficients ( ) and ℎ( ) .
Each consumer i in market t chooses the app j that maximizes his/her utility. 5 The aggregate market share for app j in market t is then the probability that app j gives the highest utility across all apps including the outside good. More specifically, we compute the predicted market share of app j in market t as the integral over the distribution of demographic characteristics D as well as over the standard normal random variable vector v as follows: (5) where the McFadden's (1978) "inclusive values" or "logsums" are defined by:
where G is the number of nests at the top-level, H g is the number of sub-nests under nest g, and finally
J hg is the number of apps in top-level nest g and middle-level h. In our data, J hg is set to 400 in all nests.
Supply-Side: Cost Function and App Pricing
We assume there are N app developers, indexed by f, each of which produces some subset, J f apps of the J apps. The cost characteristics for each app are decomposed into an observable component (by the researcher), w jt for app j in market t and an unobserved component, ω jt . That is, we assume that marginal costs may not necessarily be zero in a mobile app setting, and we estimate the marginal costs using a list of observed app characteristics. The rationale for assuming non-zero marginal costs is that various maintenance tasks after app development incurs ongoing costs. Such maintenance tasks typically involve 1) fixing crashes or errors reported by users of the app, 2) adding features requested by users after release, 3) user support incurs an ongoing cost that varies depending on the popularity of the app and how easy it is to use (for example, networking apps may require hosting and administrative costs), and 4) scaling costs. If an app becomes popular and uses a server or shared database, additional servers may be required or code may need to be optimized to scale more effectively to maintain high performance with more users (Drewcrawfordapps 2011) . In addition, similar to Berry et al. (1995) , we expect the observed app characteristics, the x jt , to be part of the w jt , and ω jt to be correlated with ξ jt .
5 A multiple discrete choice model is necessary if consumers download more than one app on the same day. We have calculated daily app download frequency per user in the US by app store (Google Play and Apple App Store) and by app price type (free and paid) using external sources such as Xyologic and Distimo (leading mobile app consulting firms). We find the average daily app downloads frequency per user does not exceed 0.54 in any app store and price type. In particular, the daily average number of paid app download per user is typically less than 0.05. That an average individual user buys at most 0.54 apps per day suggests that a multiple discrete choice model may not be necessary in our app demand estimation. So we assume the conditional independence of the possible multiple purchases on the same day. Nonetheless, we empirically tested the validity of our assumption of a single discrete choice model by conducting model fit comparison with alternative multiple discrete choice models as robustness checks in section 5.2.
We incorporate two unique features of mobile apps -in-app purchase options (IAP) and in-app advertisement (IADV) -into the marginal cost function. The IAP provides app developers with incentives to lower their app sales prices so that the app developers can increase their customer base at the expense of immediate app sales revenues in expectation that they can get additional revenues from future in-app purchases. Similarly, including ads in an app is another way to monetize apps. It also provides the app developers with incentives to lower their app prices. The majority of free apps are driven by in-app advertising. Hence, the marginal cost of app j in market t, mc jt , is written as
where γ, 1 , and are parameters to be estimated. Here IAP jt is an indicator variable identifying the availability of in-app purchase options in app j at market t. It takes the value of 1 if the app has in-app purchase option and 0 otherwise. IADV jt is an indicator variable identifying the availability of in-app ad in app j at market t. It takes the value of 1 if the app includes in-app advertising and 0 otherwise.
Note that we do not have revenue information from either in-app purchases or in-app advertisement in the current data set. In the absence of such revenue information, we assume that the total revenue of a given app from in-app purchase and in-app advertisement sales is proportional to the number of downloads of that app. Therefore, given the demand function in (4), the profit of app developer f, Π f , is
where mc jt is given by (6), M is the total market size, and s jt is the market share of app j given by (5).
Similar to Berry et al. (1995) , we assume each app developer chooses prices that maximize its profit given the characteristics of its apps and the prices and the characteristics of competing app developers.
The price vector satisfies the first-order conditions as follows:
The J first-order conditions in (8) imply price-cost markups for each app. In vector notation, the firstorder conditions can then be written as
where ∆ jrt = if r and j are produced by the same app developer in a given market t and ∆ jrt = 0 otherwise. Due to the missing revenue data from in-app purchases and in-app advertisement, we assume that the unit price of in-app purchase option and the unit revenue from in-app advertisement (i.e., CPM)
are independent of the app sales price. Thus the first-order conditions in equation (9) is the same as that without considering IAP and IADV in the revenue function except that the price will be lower by 1 and .
Prices are additively separable in marginal cost and the markup defined as
Substituting in the expression for the marginal cost in (6), we obtain the cost function as follows:
Since P is a function of ω, ( , , ̅, ̅ , , , ) is a function of ω. Also the correlation between ξ and ω generates a dependence between the markups and ω (BLP 1995) . Hence, the parameters in (11), γ, 1 , and can be estimated if we assume orthogonality conditions between ω and appropriate instruments.
Estimation
We discuss how we identify the estimates of the parameters. As mentioned in the previous subsection, we build a structural model of user demand for mobile apps and jointly estimate it with supply-side equations. Estimating the demand and supply jointly has the advantage of increasing the efficiency of the estimates, at the cost of requiring more structure (Nevo 2000) . Our goal here is to estimate the mean and deviation of α i and β i and the mean of the nesting coefficients, ( ) and ℎ( ) , in the demand side and the mean of γ and θ in the supply side. We apply methods similar to those used in Berry et al. (1995) and Grigolon and Verboven (2011) . In general, with a given starting value of ( , , ), from the demand side, we look for the mean utility δ, such that the model-predicted market share is equal to the observed market share. As mentioned in the previous subsection 4.2, from the supply side, we compute the marginal cost mc. We then form a GMM objective function using the BLP's (1995) assumption that the supply and demand unobservables are mean independent of both observed app characteristics and cost shifters. Then we update the parameter value of ( 1 , 1 , 1 ) and use it as the starting point for the next-round iteration. This procedure is repeated until the algorithm finds the optimal values of parameters that minimizes the GMM objective function. Specifically, we conduct the estimation in the following manner. We prepare the data including draws from the distribution of individual characteristics, v and D. For v, we draw from standard normal distribution. For D, we use empirical distribution of user age and gender. We use a leading global mobile advertising network, AdMob's (2010) comprehensive report on mobile metrics to capture demographic data by app store. We have access to the distributional information of age and gender. 7 For each market we draw 1,000 individuals. In the context of mobile apps, some consumers appear over time within a given app store but not across different app stores. This is because multi-homing is rare on the consumer demand side. For example, people usually own either Apple iPhone or Android-based phone, but not both.
Thus, they use either Apple App Store or Google Play, respectively, not both at the same time. So we use different draws across app stores while use same draws within an app store.
For given values of Π, Σ, and , we compute mean utility level δ that equates the predicted market shares to the observed shares and compute the marginal cost mc by subtracting the computed mark-ups from the price. And, for given Π, Σ, , δ and mc, we compute the unobserved parameter for app characteristics, ξ, and the unobserved parameter for cost component, ω, then interact them with a set of instrumental variables, and finally compute the value of the GMM objective function. Since the mean utility parameters, mean cost components, and other control variables are linear parameters, we solve them as a function of the other (non-linear) parameters -Π, Σ, and while we search for the value of the non-linear parameters that minimizes the objective function. Details are provided in Appendix B.
Instruments
It is critical to address price endogeneity in demand estimation. To separate the exogenous variation in prices (i.e., due to differences in marginal costs) and endogenous variation (i.e., due to differences in unobserved valuation), we use two sets of instruments. First, we use BLP-style instruments. Specifically, following BLP's (1995), we use the observed app characteristics (excluding price), the sums of the values of the same characteristics of apps offered by the same app developer, and the sums of the values of the same characteristics of apps offered by other app developers. The identifying assumption is that observed app characteristics are uncorrelated with unobserved app characteristics.
Some observed app characteristics and the app price can be correlated with each other when they are exposed to a common (unobserved) shock. As a result, there is a potential concern of endogeneity for these observed app characteristics. To address this concern, we have included a total of 39 indicator variables (called App Version Updates) that capture a series of major app version updates as additional controls in the demand equation. For example, the first indicator variable takes the value of 1 if there is a first major version update for a given app during our sampling period and 0 otherwise. The second indicator variable has the value of 1 if there is a second major version update and 0 otherwise, and so on.
The rationale for using these controls is that when an app developer releases an updated version of a given app, some of the app characteristics (e.g., file size, app description) change as well. The version update indicator variables will capture the impact of the unobserved shock on the observed app characteristics. Thus, by controlling for these version updates in the demand equation, we alleviate the concern of endogeneity in observed app characteristics. As a result, we avoid violating the independence assumption between observed and unobserved app characteristics in using BLP-style instruments.
Second, we use the average price of same-category apps by the 'same app developer' in the other app store and the price of the same app by the 'same app developer' in the other app store as instruments for price. This is similar in spirit to Hausman's (1996) approach. Similar to , the identification assumption is that, after controlling for app developers and consumer demographics, app store-specific valuations are independent across app stores (but are allowed to be correlated within an app store). Hence, prices of same-category apps by the 'same app developer' and prices of the same app by the 'same app developer' in different app stores will be correlated due to the common marginal costs, but due to the independence assumption will be uncorrelated with app store-specific valuation. The rationale for assuming that marginal costs of same-category apps by the same developer across two app stores are correlated to each other is that 1) same-category apps by the same developer share similar cost components and 2) multi-homing (i.e., hosting an app at more than one app store) is quite popular on the supply side in the mobile app context. App developers use modules to create a new mobile app. When they develop a new app within a given category (i.e., gaming apps), they tend to re-use the existing modules of the same app category. Thus the development and maintenance costs of the same-category apps tend to be correlated to each other.
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In addition, we assume that shocks on one app store do not necessarily affect demand on the other app store. This is because although multi-homing is popular on the supply side, it may be rare on the consumer demand side. For example, people do not usually own both the Apple iPhone and Androidbased phone simultaneously. Rather at any given point in time, they typically own either of the two, and use either Apple App Store or Google Play. We performed an F-test in the first stage for each of the instruments. In each case, the F-test value was well over 10, suggesting our instruments are valid (i.e., the instruments are not weak). In addition, the Hansen's J-Test could not reject the null hypothesis of valid over-identifying restrictions. All instruments yielded similar results.
8 Furthermore, multi-homing costs become increasingly lower due to evolving hybrid and Web-oriented mobile architectures. Mobile app development is moving from native architecture (OS/Device specific) to becoming increasingly device agnostic through Hybrid and Web-oriented mobile architectures to reach out to a larger customer base (OnlineEconomy 2012 , Hyrynsalmi et al. 2012 . For example, certain Mobile Application Development Platforms (MADP), like Antenna AMP, offer cross-platform suites that enable a single app shell to be executed on multiple mobile devices, using device-and OS-specific client apps. Thus to the extent that multihoming is popular on the supply side, the development and maintenance costs of a given app (of a given app developer) across multiple app stores will be correlated to each other.
Inference of Market Share Data
Market shares are obtained from aggregating over consumers. We define a "market" as the combination of an "app store" and a "day." Correspondingly, the market share for each app is calculated based on the number of downloads for that app in that app store divided by the "total size of that market."
Importantly, as Apple apps are not compatible with Android Apps, we treat Apple App Store and Google Play as different markets. Moreover, Apple's iOS users can only purchase apps from Apple App Store. However, Android users can purchase apps not only from Google Play but also from other Android-based app stores such as third-party app stores. So with regard to market size, for Apple apps,
we define the total number of apps purchased in a given market based on data only from Apple App Store. However, for Google Play apps, we define the total number of apps purchases in a given market based on data not only from Google Play but also from other Android-based app stores including thirdparty app stores, mobile carrier's app stores, and mobile device manufacturer-based app stores (excluding Apple App Store). Figure 2 demonstrates there are two markets at a given day, and we use both app-level panel data and app store-level aggregate level data to compute the market share of apps in each market. Hence, the outside good is defined as "no purchase during a given day" for Apple users and as "no purchase from Google Play but possibly from other app stores during a given day" for Android users (see Appendix C for detail). To get access to demand data, we collaborated with a major third-party app store in the market. Similar to the aforementioned papers, we assume that the relationship between app sales ranks and sales quantity follows the Pareto distribution. Based on the estimates of parameters of the Pareto distribution, we infer the sales quantity of apps and finally calculate market shares of apps. Details are provided in Appendix C.
Empirical Results
In this section, we present our results from jointly estimating the demand and the pricing equation,
show robustness to several alternative specifications, present results on counterfactual analyses, and discuss the welfare impact from the introduction of mobile apps.
Estimation Results
The results of the estimates are in Table 2 . The first column shows results based on BLP-style instruments while the second column shows results based on Hausman-style instruments. We find results remain qualitatively the same regardless of the use of the instrument set.
In the first panel, estimates of the mean utility levels for each app characteristic are presented. We find a 10% price discount results in 5% increase in app demand, with a greater increase of app demand in Google Play compared to Apple App Store (7% and 3%, respectively). Longer wait times to download a sophisticated app adversely affect consumer's app purchase decisions. We find a 10% increase in file size results in 1.1% decrease in app demand. We find a 10% increase in description length results in 2.3% increase in app demand and adding one more screenshot increases app demand 4.2%. Thus it is important for app developers to provide customers with sufficient amount of textual and visual information about their apps in order to increase their app demand. In terms of age-restriction, compared to "general" (or 4+) apps, "low maturity" (or 9+), "medium maturity" (or 12+), and "high maturity (or 17+) apps lower demand. This result indicates apps that contain simulated gambling, or include references to violence, sex, drugs, alcohol or tobacco in general have a negative impact on app demand.
Interestingly, in-app purchase (IAP) and in-app advertisement (IADV) options have different effects on app demand. While the IAP increases app demand, the IADV decreases it. This difference is attributable to the fact that the IAP provides benefits through additional features and functionalities, while the IADV can cause annoyance on the demand side. App age and version age have a positive impact on app demand. And the app age has a positive curvilinear effect. This result indicates that maturity of apps play an important role in consumers' app purchase decisions. We find a 10% increase in app age and version age results in 1.7% and 0.5% increase in app demand, respectively. The number of apps developed by the developer has a positive effect on app demand. This result suggest that if the developer has created a large number of high quality apps in the past, then consumers might trust the app from this developer and this will influence the demand of app also. Further, the number of previous versions has a positive effect on app demand. This result indicates that quality updates is an important driver for demand in a mobile app setting, hence the demand for the new version may also be influenced by the demand from the previous versions.
Cross-chart listing has a positive effect on app demand. This result suggests that when an app appears both in the free top 400 and the paid top 400 lists, the demand becomes higher as compared to when the same app appears only in one of these two lists. This is possibly because if an app developer releases both the free and paid versions, consumers can try the free version first and then migrate to the paid version. As a result, it generates a positive cross-chart listing correlation in consumers' ex ante utility. 9 We find that cross-platform listing has a positive effect on app demand as well. This result indicates that if an app developer releases its app in both platforms (Apple App Store and Google Play), consumers become more aware of the app, and consequently, some spillover effects generate positive cross-platform correlation in consumers' ex ante utility.
With regard to the user reviews, both the volume and the valence of user rating have a positive impact on app demand, as one would expect. The volume of user reviews has a positive curvilinear effect on app demand. Further, apps on Apple iOS platform in general have a positive impact on app demand as compared to apps on Google Android OS platform. Lastly, we find each nesting parameter is small and statistically significant. As it is close to zero, this result implies that consumer preferences show strong correlation across apps from the same group at a top-level (i.e., within the same list -free or paid) and at a middle-level (i.e., within the same category).
The second panel presents the effect of demographics on the mean utility levels. Recall that the mean price coefficient is negative. Thus the positive estimate of interaction between app price and consumer age suggests that while the average consumer is sensitive to the price of apps, older consumers tend to be less price sensitive than younger consumers. Similarly, the positive estimate of interaction between app price and consumer gender (1: male, 0: female) indicates that male consumers tend to be less price sensitive than female consumers.
In the third panel, the distribution of parameters across users captures the effects of heterogeneity around the mean utility level for each app characteristic due to the unobserved demographics. The effects are statistically significant for file size, age-restriction level (+9), and in-app purchase options.
This result indicates that the heterogeneity in the coefficient is partly explained by the standard deviations, suggesting it is important to incorporate customer taste heterogeneity in our empirical data.
Finally, in the fourth panel, the estimates of the cost-side parameters are presented. We find that file size has a positive impact on cost, thus it seems a cost driver in mobile app development. However, app description length and number of screenshots do not have impact on app cost. In terms of age-restriction, compared to "general" (or 4+) apps, "low maturity" (or 9+), "medium maturity" (or 12+), and "high maturity (or 17+) apps cost more to develop. We find in-app purchase options and in-app advertisement are major cost inhibitors in the mobile app setting. This result suggests that both in-app purchases and in-app advertising provide the app developers with incentives to lower their app sales prices while they impact app demand. Further, app age has a negative impact on cost. Ongoing marginal costs for app developers arise from various maintenance-related tasks after app development. Thus, this finding suggests that developers of mature apps incur lower costs for periodic updates and fixing bugs through a learning process. Also, the number of apps provided by the same developer has a negative impact on cost, indicating returns to scale in app development seem substantial. We find as compared to lifestyle apps, in games, social, and utilities app categories the marginal cost is large, on the contrary, in media apps category the marginal cost is smaller. Lastly, app developers in general incur lower cost for their apps on Apple iOS platform as compared to apps on Google OS platform.
<Insert Table 2 about here>
Robustness Checks
We implemented a series of robustness checks and found our results are robust to these modifications.
(i) Separate Estimation for Each App Store
We estimate our main model by pooling the data from both app stores, with one platform dummy variable indicating the app store. Having only one dummy variable might not be able to fully capture the differences of the demand between these two platforms. This is because consumers' self-selection into a platform in the first place (Apple iOS or Google Android) may attract different types of consumers. For example, Google Android users might be more tech-savvy and Apple users might be less so, which might be correlated with their preference on apps. To address this concern, we estimate our model specification separately for Apple App Store and for Google Play (for details, see Table A .1 and A.2 in Appendix A). The results indicate that overall our key coefficient estimates remain qualitatively the same between two app stores in terms of the sign and the statistical significance. We compare the effects of different pricing strategies on app demand by using expected own price elasticities. We find that the app demand is more price elastic in Google Play than in Apple App Store (the expected own price elasticity is -3.731 and -1.973, respectively). Our counter-factual experiments on the effects of price discounts in section 5.3 also demonstrate that Google Play users are more price sensitive than Apple users. This finding is consistent with numerous trade press reports that Apple device users are less price sensitive than device users on other platforms such as Android and Windows.
(ii) Multiple Discrete Choice Model
App users can sometimes download multiple apps on the same day. This can happen if there are some complementarities in the functionalities of those apps. A multiple discrete choice model is necessary if consumers download multiple apps in a given day. Hence, we relax the assumption that consumers can purchase only one app per day, the one with the highest utility. We extend our single discrete choice, nested logit model to a multiple discrete choice setting using Fan's (2012) approach.
The key difference between the single discrete choice model (our main model) and the multiple discrete choice models is that the sum of "market shares" in a given market can be larger than 1 in the multiple discrete choice model. "Market penetration" is therefore a better term and is used in the multiple discrete choice model. We consider two alternative multiple discrete choice models -a two discrete choice model and a three discrete choice model. In the two discrete choice model, the probability that a consumer downloads app j is the sum of the probability that j is the first choice and the probability that j is the second choice (Fan 2012). In a similar vein, in the three discrete choice model, the probability that a consumer download app j is the sum of the probability that j is the first choice, the probability that j is the second choice, and the probability that j is the third choice.
We conduct model fit comparison of the single discrete choice model (our main model) with the aforementioned alternative multiple discrete choice models. We use both in-sample and out-of-sample data and measure root mean square error (RMSE), mean square error (MSE), and mean absolute deviation (MAD). We allow the data to determine which model provides the best description of the data. Table 3 provides the model fit comparison results. We find that the single choice model provides the best performance in both in-and out-of-sample predictions. This result lends support to the validity of our assumption of the single discrete choice model in our empirical context. Note that because the fit of the three-choice model is worse than that of the two-choice model and that of the two-choice model is worse than that of the single choice model, we show below results from the k-discrete choice models when k is up to three. In general, as we increase the number of app purchases per day from 1 to 2 to 3 and even beyond that, we find that fit of the model deteriorates. 10 Further, we find the estimation results from multiple discrete choice models remain qualitatively consistent with the single choice model. Table   A .3 in Appendix A provides estimation results on multiple discrete choice models.
<Insert Table 3 about here>
(iii) Group-Specific Nesting Coefficients Model
We relax the assumption of same nesting coefficient for all the nests at each level. To be specific,
we allow the degree of preference correlation among free apps to be different from that among paid apps, and also allow the degree of preference correlation across categories to be different from each other. Our findings indicate that overall main results remain qualitatively the same regardless of the use of separate nesting coefficients (for details, see Table A .4 in Appendix A). With regard to nesting coefficients, we find that the top-level nesting coefficients (i.e., 0.228 and 0.240) are quite similar to the top-level nesting coefficient in the main model (i.e., 0.236). Further, the middle-level nesting coefficients are also similar to the middle-level nesting coefficient in the main model. This suggests the benefit of having separate nesting coefficients as compared to just one nesting coefficient at each level seem less significant in our empirical context.
(iv) Pure Characteristics Model (PCM)
The pure characteristics model provides an alternative way of estimating consumer demand by eliminating the idiosyncratic logit error term ε ij from the utility function. Instead consumer preferences are only related to product characteristics by relying solely on the unobserved product characteristics and unobserved variation in taste parameters to generate stochastic choices Pakes 2007, Song 2007 ). We find results remain qualitatively the same. That is, the signs of the estimates for the mean utility and the standard deviations (i.e., the individual specific deviation from that mean) for each app characteristic are similar as in the main model (for detail, see Table A .5 in Appendix A).
(v) Tablet Apps from Apple App Store
The rapid adoption of tablets has driven the widespread use of tablet apps. As an additional robustness check to see if our results are driven from some smartphone-specific idiosyncrasies, we examine a dataset of tablet apps from the Apple App Store that has similar information on app sales rank, app prices, app characteristics, and user review data from the US market. Our findings indicate that the main results remain qualitatively the same (for detail, see Table A .6 in Appendix A). One key difference was that a 10% price discount results in 1.9% increase in Apple tablet app demand as compared to 3.0% increase in Apple smartphone app demand in the US market. This suggests that tablet users are less price sensitive than smartphone users. This finding is consistent with media reports that tablet users generally have more disposable income.
Counterfactual Experiments
A key advantage of structural modeling is that it allows for normative policy evaluation. To generate insights for businesses interested in mobile analytics, we conducted several counterfactual experiments. Specifically, these counterfactuals demonstrate the (i) direct and indirect effects of in-app purchase and in-app advertising, (ii) effects of app pricing strategies on app demand, price elasticity comparison across app stores and optimal discount prices that maximize revenues from app sales, and (iii) substitution patterns across app categories.
(i) Counterfactual Experiment I: Effects of In-App Purchase Options and In-App Advertisement
In-app purchase (IAP) and in-app advertisement (IADV) options are increasingly popular monetization options for app developers. According to Distimo (2011) , half of the revenue of the top 200 grossing apps in the Apple App Store for iPhone is generated from in-app purchases. This proportion is even higher in the Google Play where 65% of the revenue from the top grossing apps is generated by in-app purchases.
The IAP provides additional features beyond the basic functionalities of an app. Thus, providing IAP options directly increases the demand of an app beyond its indirect effect on app demand due to price decrease on the supply side. In a similar vein, the IADV is likely to cause annoyance and hence decrease app demand. Here we conduct counterfactual experiments to distinguish the direct effect of the IAP on app sales from the indirect effect of the IAP due to price decrease. We repeat the same counterfactual experiments for the IADV as well. In our simulation setup, we allow for the IAP (or the IADV) in apps that previously did not offer such options, and examined subsequent changes in demand.
We repeated this experiment for each app without the IAP (or the IADV) in our sample, then calculated the percentage changes in market shares for that app before and after the IAP (or the IADV) option. Figure 3 demonstrates the direct effects of the IAP and the IADV on app demand. Our findings suggest that the direct effect of the IAP option results in an increase in app demand by 17% due to additional functionalities beyond its indirect effect due to price decrease. In the case of the IADV, we find that the direct effect of advertising annoyance causes a decrease in app demand by 4%, as one would expect besides its indirect effect due to an increase in revenues from in-app advertisement. Since we do not observe any revenue data from in-app purchases and in-app advertisement, we computed the equivalent amount of price discount to the direct effects of in-app purchase and in-app advertisement options, respectively. Figure 4 shows that on average the direct effect on the increase in market share from having an in-app purchase option is equivalent to offering a 28% price discount. In other words, offering additional features in apps leads to the same increase in revenues as lowering app prices by 28%. Similarly, an in-app advertisement leads to the same decrease in revenues as raising app prices by 8%.
<Insert Figure 3 and Besides in-app purchase and in-app advertisement options, app developers can earn more revenues through significant price discount. Distimo (2012) reported that when apps are on sale the average revenue rose by 41% in Apple iPhone App Store when looking at those apps that were among the top 100 ranked apps. Moreover, the revenue during the whole sales period increased by 22%. In Google Play on the first day of price reduction the revenue increased by 7%, and during the wholesale period increased by 29%.
To examine how price reduction for paid apps will affect app demand, we conducted the following counterfactual experiments. We assume price reduction by 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50%, and examined subsequent demand changes, respectively. We repeated this experiment one at a time for each app in our sample and calculated the percentage changes in market shares for that app before and after the price reduction. Our findings show that overall a decrease in price has a greater impact on app demand in Google Play than Apple App Store. Figure 5 demonstrates comparison of the effects of different pricing strategies on app demand across Apple App Store and Google Play. For example, a 50%
price discount results in a 20% increase in app demand in Apple App Store as compared to a 84% increase in Google Play. 11 This result may reflect the fact that Google Play users are intrinsically more price sensitive than Apple users. This finding is very consistent with numerous trade press reports that Apple device users are less price sensitive than device users on other platforms such as Android and Windows.
<Insert Figure 5 about here>
We conducted additional counterfactual experiments to search for the optimal price discounts in terms of maximizing app sales revenues. Notice that we have computed the revenue change by comparing app sales revenues before and after lowering price. Figure 6 shows that app developers can maximize their revenue by providing 50% discount on their paid apps.
<Insert Lastly, we looked into how price changes in one app category will affect the demand for other app categories. Table 4 shows changes in column-app-category's market shares with respect to 30% price cut in the row-app-category. We performed this experiment one at a time for each app in a given app category, then calculated the average percentage changes in market shares at the category level. For example, when we lowered the price by 30% for a social networking app and found that the demand for the social networking app category increases 11% while the demand for multimedia apps drops 7%, implying the social networking apps and the multimedia apps acts as substitutes for each other. We also conducted similar analyses for apps from other categories. Our findings suggest that social apps in general substitute to other apps. In particular, the substitution effects between social apps and multimedia apps are strong.
<Insert Table 4 about here>
From the above set of counterfactual experiments, the basic findings are as follows: (i) the in-app purchases and in-app advertisement bring economic benefits equivalent to offering a 45% price discount and 13% price discount, respectively, (ii) price discount strategy is more appropriate for apps in Google
Play to increase app demand and the optimal price discount is 50% discount, and (iii) social apps in general substitute to other apps.
Welfare Estimation
Previous studies have shown that product variety increase consumer welfare (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003 , Ghose et al. 2006 . Also, competition lowers product prices (e.g. Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000), which also increase the welfare. Hausman and Leonard (2002) break the total welfare impact from the introduction of a new product into two components: (1) the variety effect resulting from the availability of the new product and (2) the price effect resulting from changes of prices of existing products. Only the variety effect becomes relevant in our empirical setting because there are no existing apps before the launch of the app store. Hence, we focus on the welfare impact resulting from the availability of apps.
Assuming that there is no income effect (i.e., does not vary as a result of the price change), according to McFadden (1981) we integrate analytically the extreme value distribution of , then the customer welfare in the random coefficient nested logit model is calculated as:
where I ig is a group-specific inclusive value at the top-level as defined in equation (5), ns is the number of consumers in the market and q jt is the quantity of app j sold at time t. We divide the changes in indirect utilities by α i (i.e., marginal utility of income) to measure monetary changes.
We next calculate the consumer surplus for mobile users in the US. There are 224 million active mobile app users in the U.S. as of February 2013 (Flurry 2013) , allowing over 70% of the population to surf the web and download mobile apps. Using the estimated demand function and inferred sales quantity of apps, we find that the availability of top ranked apps in both Apple and Google platforms enhanced consumer surplus in the US by approximately $11.3 billion over the time period of our study.
In addition, it is important to note that equation (4) suggests that we computed consumer surplus gains from downloading of apps into one's mobile devices compared to not downloading apps at all.
Given that people can download Web apps (instead of mobile apps) into their desktops or/and laptops, a more realistic baseline level to compute the consumer surplus of mobile apps against will be downloading Web apps. Since we do not have Web app sales information, we attempt to adjust the above consumer surplus estimate using the ratio of number of mobile apps and Web apps in the market. According to MobiThinking (2012) , there are approximately 400,000 active mobile apps and about 4,800 Web apps from various app stores. 12 Keeping this in mind, the adjusted consumer surplus is approximately $11.2 billion over the time period of our study, which translates into $33.6 billion annually in this market. 
Managerial Implications and Conclusions
A fundamental innovation brought forth by the advent of the mobile internet has been the widespread adoption of mobile apps. The barriers to building and distributing a compelling mobile app are falling and the ways for mobile app developers to monetize these apps are increasing, creating a vibrant mobile ecosystem. Apps are transitioning from being a tool to being a medium that people express themselves through. As consumers increasingly use mobile devices, it becomes important to understand the underlying drivers of user demand for mobile apps. In this paper, we estimate a structural model of user demand in a mobile app setting, present results on counterfactual analyses, and quantify the consumer surplus from the availability of such mobile apps.
12 http://mobithinking. com/native-or-web-app/. 13 The adjusted consumer surplus during our 4-month sampling period is derived by multiplying the un-adjusted consumer surplus, $11.3 billion, by the number of active mobile apps, 400,000, and then divide this value by the total number of mobile and Web apps, 404,800. Then the annualized, adjusted consumer surplus is derived by dividing the aforementioned adjusted consumer surplus by 4, and then multiply the value by 12.
We show demand increases with the app description length, number of screenshots, in-app purchase option, app age, version age, number of apps by the same developer, number of previous versions, crosschart listing, cross-platform listing, and volume and valence of user reviews. On the contrary, app demand decreases with file size and in-app advertisement option. Older and male consumers tend to be less sensitive to the price of apps than younger and female consumers, respectively. On the supply-side we show that app file size is a major cost driver in app development but that there are significant returns to scale in app development. Cost decreases with in-app purchase, in-app advertisement, app age, and age restrictions. Compared to lifestyle apps, games, social, and utility apps have higher marginal costs while media apps have lower marginal costs.
We show that app developers tend to lower their upfront app prices when they provide an in-app purchase option within their apps. This finding is consistent with a recent report (Apsalar 2012) that shows when consumers spend on paid apps they are less likely to spend inside an app because paid apps serve as an economic substitute for in-app purchases.
14 With regard to in-app advertisement, although it adversely affects app demand, we found that it is worth adding in-app advertisement because advertisement revenues can be larger than the loss from consumer avoidance of ad-loaded apps.
When a developer offers a price discount on an app with an in-app purchase option, there's a delicate balance that has to be achieved. On the one hand, the sale price has to be low enough to trigger enough downloads to make up for the lost revenue. On the other hand, future purchases from within the downloaded app should be high enough to make up for the lost revenue from offering the price discount in the first place. We show that app developers can maximize their revenue from paid app sales by offering 50% price discount. Thus, this finding provides a good benchmark for app developers as they grapple with the conundrum regarding how much discount to offer on the sale price of an app. We presented follow-up analyses on pricing strategies and showed that a price discount results in a greater increase of app demand in Google Play compared to Apple App Store. We found social apps act as a substitute for many other apps and in particular, the substitution effects between social apps and multimedia apps are strong. In addition, we showed the availability of mobile apps enhanced consumer surplus approximately $33.6 billion in the US on an annual basis.
Data availability issues suggest that some caution is warranted in the demand and welfare estimation.
For example, some consumers may first narrow down the entire set of apps to a smaller set and then make a decision from the consideration set. We do not have user-level app purchase data and therefore are unable to model this issue accordingly. Moreover, including the consideration stage into a random utility framework is not trivial because the consideration sets are neither observed nor identifiable with certainty (Ben-Akiva and Boccara 1995). Thus we cannot separately empirically identify a consideration set and user demand for apps due to limitations in our data. Future work may consider using a model of the underlying consideration formation and structurally estimate demand with data on individual-level user browsing patterns.
Our app-level data cannot distinguish whether multiple downloads of an app originate from a single user through multiple mobile devices (i.e., a smartphone and a tablet) or whether they are from multiple users. Future research can consider a multivariate probit model (Manchanda et al. 1999 ) to model possible inter-dependency across apps when an average consumer purchases multiple apps per day, provided they have data on individual-level data and the number of apps is not too large. We do not observe app usage data. Future research can consider a unified model of the demand for app usage with discrete app purchase choices, provided they have individual-level data on app usage. Further, our data set does not contain price menu information of in-app purchases. Future research may consider examining how app developers set their price menu of in-app purchases and determine the in-app advertisement price, and how they affect consumer demand and cost function equations.
Notwithstanding these limitations, to the extent that prices and product characteristics of mobile apps affect market outcomes, the increasing size of the mobile app industry may have profound implications for the future direction of mobile commerce and mobile customer analytics.
This paper presents the first formal model of app-level demand estimation that is based on observing users' app downloading behavior. Such analysis is a step towards enabling different kinds of mobile analytics. Mobile analytics is of interest to managers for several reasons such as optimizing app content and navigation, improving app merchandizing such as placement of ads and product links within apps, and perform customer analytics. Understanding how customers interact with the mobile channel is vital to the success of a brand's mobile strategy.
Mobile analytics provides firms with insights into customer engagement, behavior and loyalty, revealing the content and media they find most compelling. It can help them track in-app ad responses, searches and purchases with the app, session duration and frequency of usage and so on. Analyzing which platform (Apple or Android) and device (smart phone, tablet or PC) is giving them the best performance on the above metrics, helps brands figure out how to optimally allocate resources. For example, companies like Flurry and Localytics have analytics packages that let publishers see the devices that users have and the features that their devices incorporate. Having this information helps them infer, for example, if adding a feature to their app that makes use of a user's microphone should be done over some other feature incorporating the user's camera. Brands have realized that mobile apps offer a viable channel to promote their brand, reach consumers, and sell products. Recent reports from the US market also show that time spent in mobile apps has now exceeded mobile Web usage, so it makes sense that there is a systematic reallocation of advertising dollars into apps. The results from our paper highlighting key determinants of app demand and development costs can help firms understand how to manage marketing in mobile app platforms. Note: *** significant at 0.01, ** significant at 0.05, * significant at 0.1; (L) logarithm of the variable The reference level for age restriction is +4. The referent level for app category is lifestyle apps. Coefficients for fixed effects of time (day), app developers, app version updates are omitted due to brevity. 
